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Sparkman: The History and Status of Local Government Powers in Florida

THE HISTORY AND STATUS OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT POWERS IN FLORIDA
STEVEN L. SPARRMAN*

The 1968 revision of the Florida Constitution embodied the most fundamental change in the relationship of the state and local governments in the
state's history. Because of the unique language employed, however, the apparently intended reforms were not accomplished by the new constitution
in and of itself. This study will trace briefly the history of the development
of local government in Florida as seen through state statutory and constitutional provisions. More attention will then be devoted to the legislative
power relationships between the state and local governments under the 1885
constitution. Next, by way of introduction to the final section of the study,
will be a brief examination of the concept of home rule as it has developed
around the country. The final and major section wil be devoted to an
analysis of the provisions of the 1968 revision, subsequent implementing
legislation and proposals, and the attitude of the legislature and the courts
toward home rule in Florida.
DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

UNDER EARLY AMERICAN

RULE

The history of local governments in Florida dearly predates American
rule of Florida's territory. In an ordinance signed July 21, 1821,1 four days
after having met with Spanish officials in Pensacola to receive possession of
Florida for the United States, Provisional Governor Andrew Jackson specifically recognized the cities of Pensacola and St. Augustine as existing governmental entities. 2 This ordinance is also significant in that it established in
Florida the American form of local government known as the "county."Sec. 1. That the said Provinces be divided as follows:
All the country lying between the Perdido and Suwaney rivers,
with all the islands therein shall form one country [sic] to be called
Escambia.
All the country lying East of the river Suwaney, and every part of
the ceded territories, not designated as belonging to the former county,
shall form a county to be called St. Johns.
Government in the two counties was provided for by the establishment
of county courts composed of five justices of the peace. 4 Their primary
functions were of a judicial nature, but they were also empowered to grant
and recall "licenses or commissions for innkeepers, retailers of liquors of
every description and keepers of billiard tables" to be exercised outside
* BA.1969, J.D. 1972, Florida State University; Member of the Florida Bar.
1. Ordinances of Major General Andrew Jackson, 25 F.SA. S05-07 (1970).
2. Id. §§12, 15.
3. Id. §1.

4. Id. §2.
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Pensacola and St. Augustine,5 to direct "the police of the roads and bridges
without the limits of Pensacola and St. Augustine" ' and "to impose such
taxes upon the inhabitants of their counties respectively, as in their discretion
may be necessary to meet and defray the expenses which may be incurred
in carrying this ordinance into effect." 7 Other county officers provided for
were a clerk of the court, sheriff, additional justices of the peace, and the
continuation of the "Alcaldes' " exercise of powers of probate judges, registers
of wills, notaries public, justices of the peace, et cetera. 8 Thus, city government was already established in Spanish Florida and county government
dates from the earliest days of American rule.
The provisional government established under Andrew Jackson was short
lived, being replaced in 1822 by a territorial government 9 that vested the
legislative power of the territory in a legislative council composed of the
Governor and thirteen other Presidential appointees.' 0 This legislative council
was the first American body to exercise direct legislative control over the
local governments of Florida. Under the legislative council county government continued under the county court- and incorporation of additional
cities was apparently provided for by a separate act of the council for each
2
city, analogous to today's special act charter.
When Florida entered the Union its state government was organized
under the constitution of 1838. This constitution, drafted by a constitutional
convention authorized by the territorial legislative council, was adopted
January 11, 1839, after six weeks of deliberations at the city of St. Joseph. 3
It was then ratified by the people of the territory in May 1839,14 but became
effective only upon Florida's admission to the Union.- Among the earliest
acts of the general assembly, as the house and senate were collectively called,
was the act creating the entity still known as "The Board of County Commissioners," and directing the election of a board in each county of the
state.1 Boards were to be composed of four elected members 17 and the
judge of probate as ex officio member and president.' s The general governing

5. Id. §12.
6. Id. §15.
7. Id. §9.
8. Id. §§4, 6, 8.
9. Territorial Government in Florida, 25 F.S.A. 321 (1970) (originally enacted as Act
of March 30, 1822, 3 Stat. 654).
10. Id. §5.
11. See THoMPSON's DIG r 1st Div., tit. VIII, ch. 1 (1847), which established boards of
county commissioners and transferred to them the powers of the county courts.
12. See Law of Jan. 4, 1847, ch. 101, No. 31 [1846] Fla. Laws 57, repealing; and Laws
of Jan. 6, 1847, ch. 102, No. 32, ch. 103, No. 33 [1846] Fla. Laws amending acts incorporating
Apalachicola, Key West, and Ochesee respectively.
13. History of Florida Constitutions, 25 F.S.A. 353 (1970).
14. Id. at 353-54.
15. FLA. CONsT. art. XVII, §5 (1838).
1st Div., title VIII, ch. 1 (1847).
16. Ch. 11 [1845] Fla. Laws 32; THoMPsON'S DIGMEST
17. Id. §1.
18. Id. §3.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol25/iss2/3

2

Sparkman: The History and Status of Local Government Powers in Florida
LOCAL GOVERMEHNT POWERS IN FLORIDA

1973]

powers previously granted the county courts were transferred to the boards
of county commissioners. They included the power to:1
[S]ue for and prohibit from trespass any lands that may belong to
their counties . . . sell and dispose of the same for the use of their
respective counties . . . [and] take .cognizance of all matters relating
to the opening and keeping in repair of roads within their respective
counties, appointing overseers and surveyors of said roads, establishing
ferries, and erecting and keeping in repair bridges and causeways, and
granting writs of ad quod damnum, for the erection of mills and other
waterworks, for establishing and regulating patrols when necessary,
and for the maintenance and support of the poor and infirm ....
The second session of the general assembly saw the enactment of a state
law that, apparently for the first time under American rule, provided for
the incorporation of towns by their inhabitants without further state legislative action. 20 This law, analogous to today's general law incorporation
procedure, 21 was part of a chapter providing also for the incorporation of
academies, religious societies, libraries, and fire companies. Clearly, therefore, municipal governments were not regarded as unique corporate forms
and the powers of the towns were limited to those granted by the general
assembly, either in the "general law incorporation" act, other laws applying
to all towns generally, or in acts incorporating or relating to a specific town.
The 1838 constitution itself made little mention of towns and counties.
Article VIII, section 4, granted the general assembly the power to authorize
incorporated towns and counties to levy taxes. Reflecting the traditional role
of the county as an administrative subdivision of the state, it was used as
the basis for the establishment and administration of certain aspects of the
3
state judicial system, 22 for the administration of the election laws, 2 and as

the basis of the plan of apportionment of representation in the general
assembly.24 The general assembly was also authorized to create "corporation
5
courts" (municipal) and vest them with certain limited jurisdiction.
The first significant new constitutional provisions relative to local governments appeared in the constitution of 1861. While the board of county
commissioners was given constitutional status 2 6 the meaningful change was

in the section that directed the general assembly to enact a general law for
the incorporation of towns and prohibited incorporation by special law.27
This provision was the first instance of a constitutional limitation on the
state legislative power over local governments. The 1861 constitution was

19. Id. §8.
20. Ch. 84, §§1-21 [1846] Fla. Laws 28-33; THOMPSON'S
2 (1847).
21. FLA. STAT. §165 (1971).
22. F A. CONST. art. V (1838).
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.

FLA.
FLA.
FLA.
FLA.
FLA.

DIGEST

2d Div., title VIII, ch.

CONST. art. VI (1838).
CONST. art. IX (1838).

CONSr. art. V, §1 (1838).
CONsr. art. V, §18 (1861).
CONSr. art. IV, §24 (1861).
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also the first to recognize the distinction between general and special laws,
which later was to undergo further constitutional development and gain
great significance.
The dichotomy between special or local laws and general laws received
much more extensive treatment even as early as the constitution of 1868. Its
declaration of rights included a section requiring all laws of a general nature
to be uniforn in operation.2 8 More specifically, another section prohibited
passage of special or local laws on enumerated subjects including regulation
of local government business, elections, and tax assessment and collection.9
That section was followed by still another requiring general laws in the
enumerated cases of the preceding section and in all other cases where a
general law could be utilized.3 0 The use of general laws was also mandated
31
in two other specific local government areas, incorporation of municipalities
32
and organization or government of municipal courts.

DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1885

The constitution of 1868 was replaced by the constitution of 1885, under
which Florida operated until the revision of 1968. This document also reflected the growing involvement of the state with local governments, both
in its original form and in the many amendments added over its more than
eighty year effective span. More important than the continuing increase in
provisions relative to such areas as the judiciary, taxation, education, welfare, and health were the changes pertaining to the general-special legislation question and the fact that for the first time local government rated a
separate article.
As originally enacted, article VIII of the constitution of 1885, entitled
Counties and Cities, included eight sections. 33 Seven of these pertained to

FLA. CONsT. Decl. of Rights §11 (1868).
FLA. CONsT. art. IV, §17 (1868).
FLA. CONST. art. IV, §18 (1868).
31. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §22 (1868).
82. FLA. CONsT. art. VI, §16 (1868). The 1868 constitution contained several interesting
features that were of little long-term significance to the development of local government
in the state. Among these were the sweeping appointment powers of the Governor, which
extended to virtually all county officers, FLA. CONST. art. V, §19, art. VI, §19 (1868), and
the mandate for the establishment of a uniform system of township, FLA. CoNsr. art. IV,
§21 (1868), in addition to county and municipal government. More significantly, increasing
use of the county as an administrative subdivision of the state was evident in the more
extensive provisions relative to the judiciary, elections, and in the imposition of duties
on counties in the fields of education, FLA. CONsr. art. VIII, §8 (1868), and welfare, FLA.
CONsr. art. X, §3 (1868), are reflective of the increased demands for governmental services
that accompanied the state's growth.
33. Several amendments were made to these original eight sections during the effective
life of the 1885 constitution. County commissioners were made elective and given the power
to draw their own districts. S.J. Res. 44 [1899] Fla. Laws 358. Terms of tax assessors and
collectors were changed and treasurers were abolished as constitutional officers. Comm.
Substitute for Joint Res. 34, 89, 98 [1913] Fla. Laws 523. Finally, terms of employment were
provided for county superintendents of public instruction appointed pursuant to article
XII. S.J. Res. 221 [1965] Fla. Laws 1818.
28.
29.
30.
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counties: mandating the division of the state into "political divisions to be
called counties"; 34 recognizing the existing counties "as the legal political
divisions of the State"; 35 granting the legislature the power to create new
counties and otherwise alter existing county lines; 36 limiting removal of
county seats to general law procedures and providing that temporary county
seats be established by law in new counties; 37 providing for the gubernatorial
appointment of five commissioners from legislatively established districts in
each county whose powers, duties, and compensation were to be fixed by
law;38 providing for the election of a circuit court clerk, sheriff, constables,
tax assessor and collector, and treasurer whose powers, duties and compensation were to be prescribed by law;3 9 and providing for assistant tax assessors
within the discretion of the county commissions and for the bonding of
county officers. 40 The remaining section specifically granted to the legislature
power to establish and abolish municipalities and "to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers." 41 Thus, for the first time a Florida constitution had
addressed itself directly to the question of the creation and existence of
counties. Sections 1 through 4 and section 8 of article VIII were without
constitutional precedent. Although earlier constitutions had directed the
legislature to provide certain procedures for the incorporation of towns, there
had been no direct grant of the power to establish and abolish, nor had there
been specific language placing their "jurisdiction and powers" under direct
legislative control. These distinctions between the language and provisions
of the 1885 and earlier constitutions may have been of little practical significance, but they do at least reflect a growing trend of concern for and
awareness of the legislature's role in relation to local governments.
The constitution's attention to detail regarding counties, which contrasts
so sharply with its treatment of cities, can be traced to the fundamental
differences in their origins. As has previously been alluded to, the county
unit came into being primarily to serve as an agency of state government
42
through which many of the powers and functions of the state were exercised.
As a political subdivision of the state, it was the representative of the state's
sovereignty and was merely auxiliary to that sovereignty.43 Gradually, counties
came to be recognized by the courts as being local entities for local purposes
as well. 44 Their primary role, even then, however, remained that of an
administrative unit for the exercise of powers of state sovereignty.
In contrast, the "reason for being" of cities and towns was not for the
convenience of state government in administering its functions. This is hinted
34. FLA. CONSr. art. VIII, §1 (1885).
35. FLA.CONsr. art. VIII, §2 (1885).
56.

37.
58.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §3 (1885).
FLA.CoNsr. art. VIII, §4 (1885).
FLA. CONsr. art. VIMI, §5 (1885).
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §6 (1885).
FLA. CONsr. art. VIII, §7 (1885).
FLA. CONSr. art. VIII, §8 (1885).
Keggin v. Hillsborough Co., 71 Fla. 356, 358, 71 So. 372, 373 (1916).
Id.
Amos v. Matthews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 508 (1930).
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at by the fact that the aggregate territory of all the
coextensive with that of the state while the same is
owe their existence instead to the perceived needs
"special governmental opportunities" not available
supreme
units. 45 This was apparent in the Florida
4
1
Placid:
Lake
of
Town
v.
Davis
rel.
ex

state's counties is always
not true of cities. Cities
of their inhabitants for
through state or county
court's opinion in State

Population is essential to the creation of a municipal corporation.
The corporate body is composed of inhabitants within the territorial
limits of the municipality. While density of population, in the absence
of constitutional limitations, is a matter within legislative discretion,
it cannot be maintained that the power to establish a municipality
may be lawfully exercised where there is no population of a given
area or even where the population is absurdly disproportionate in
numbers to the area defined by boundaries. There are inherent limitations upon the Legislature in this regard imposed by the use of the
phrase "to establish, and to abolish, municipalities" in the Eighth
Section of Article VIII of the Constitution. There must exist a village,
a community of people, a settlement or a town occupying an area
small enough that those living therein may be said to have such social
contacts as to create a community of public interest and duty requiring,
in consideration of the general welfare, an organized agency for the
management of their local affairs of a quasi public nature.
The origin and history of the word "municipality" show beyond
peradventure of a doubt that two elements are essential to its existence;
a community of people, and the territory they occupy. The Legislature can create neither.
While the legislature's powers were thus limited by court decision, its
control over the existence of all municipal governments as legal entities,
and over their powers and duties, was absolute. In this respect the status of
cities and counties under article VIII of the 1885 constitution was the same.
The only significant difference was that the legislature apparently could not
47
abolish existing counties. It could, however, change boundaries and carve
48
Both counties and cities were regarded as creatures of
out new counties.
powers of their own. All powers were granted
the state, without any inherent
4
legislature.
the
of
act
by
The manner in which the state's sovereignty was exercised over local
governments was subject to other constitutional controls found outside article
VIII. The legislative article, article III, placed certain constraints upon the
legislature's exercise of that sovereignty. In doing so, it also made distinctions between counties and cities and in the manner with which they could
be dealt.

45. Tampa v. Easton, 145 Fla. 188, 196, 198 So. 753, 756 (1940).
46. 109 Fla. 419, 426-27, 147 So. 468, 471 (1933).
47.
48.

FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §2 (1885).
FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §3 (1885).

49. Masters v. Duval County, 114 Fla. 205, 210, 154 So. 172, 174, cert. denied, 293 U.S.
559 (1934).
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Article III, section 20, prohibited the enactment of special or local laws
in a number of enumerated cases, including the following:5"
[R]egulating the jurisdiction and duties of any class of officers, except
municipal officers . . . regulating the practice of courts of justice,
except municipal courts . . . vacating roads, summoning and empanelling grand and petit juries, and providing for their compensation;
for assessment, and collection of taxes for State and county purposes;
for opening and conducting elections for State and county officers, and
for designating the places of voting . . . regulating the fees of officers
of the State and county ....
This section evidenced several changes from the comparable section of
the 1868 constitution, most important for our purpose being the removal of
restrictions on special legislation with regard to municipal matters. 51 The
following section, as in the 1868 constitution, required that in all cases
enumerated in the special law prohibition, laws passed be general and of
uniform operation throughout the state.52 New language, however, specifically
permitted special and local laws in all other cases, subject only to requirements of publication of notice of the intent to introduce such legislation in
the areas to be affected, and evidence of such publication to be established
in the legislature prior to the bill's passage. 53
The possibility of conflict between this limitation on the legislature and
the sweeping grant given it by article VIII, section 8, arose and was swiftly
4
litigated in State ex rel. McQuaid v. County Commissioners of Duval County.
A unanimous court concluded that the grant of article VIII, section 8, would
be superfluous if governed by the procedural requirements of article III,
section 21, and held that the notice requirements applied only to local
legislation not dealing with municipalities. This interpretation remained
law until the constitution was amended for a second time more than fifty
55
years later.
One other section in article III spoke to the legislature's powers to provide for local governments. It contained a mandate for the establishment of
a uniform system of county and municipal government, to be applicable
except where inconsistent with local or special laws.5 6 Thus, although directed
to establish a uniform, general law system of local governments, the legislature
was free to enact local and special laws governing them, provided they conformed to certain subject matter restrictions and procedural requirements
where dealing with counties.
As previously mentioned, section 21 of article III underwent change by

50. FLA. CONsr. art. III, §20 (1885).
51. FLA. CONsr. art. I1, §20 (1885); historical note, 25 F.SA. 501 (1970).
52. FLA. CONSr. art. II, §21 (1885).
53. Id.
54. 23 Fla. 483, 3 So. 193 (1887); see Dauer & Miller, Municipal Charters in Florida:
Law and Drafting, 6 U. FLA. L. REv. 418 (1953).
55. Dauer & Miller, supra note 54, at 419.
56. FLA. CONST. art. I1, §24 (1885).
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The first of these three amendments was adopted in

57

1928.

It changed the

period for publication of notice to thirty days and provided for a referendum
as an alternative to notice. Some other minor changes in wording were made
and the requirement added that proof of publication be established by the
attachment of an affidavit to the bill. The affidavit was also required to be
entered in full following the entry showing the bill's introduction in the
journal of each house. This new detail would not seem too significant in
view of the prior requirement that "evidence that such notice has been
58
published shall be established in the Legislature." It did, however, have
important impact in regard to the related problem of general laws of local
application.5 9
The next amendment of interest was adopted in 193460 and had great
potential significance for the development of municipal government in Florida.
The amendment was to article III, section 24, which mandated the establishment of a uniform system of local governments to be applicable except where
inconsistent with special or local laws. The amendment limited the exception
6
to special or local laws for counties and added a second sentence: '
The Legislature shall by general law classify cities and towns according to population, and shall by general law provide for their incorporation, government, jurisdiction, powers, duties and privileges
under such classifications, and no special or local laws incorporating
cities or towns, providing for their government, jurisdiction, powers,
duties and privileges shall be passed by the Legislature.
The intended effect of the amendment was never felt. It was effectively
62
nullified by a supreme court decision rendered soon after its adoption. The
court held that the prohibitions on special and local laws were not selfexecuting and were therefore inoperative, since the legislature had not en63
acted a general law classification scheme. The significance of this holding
6"
is apparent from the words of a prominent Florida city attorney: '
It seems fair to say that a body of law and Constitutional construction
has been developed and followed for more than eighty years which
could have been completely different during the last thirty years had
the Supreme Court been able and willing to properly reconsider this
1934 amendment at that time or had the legislature classified cities

57. H.R.J. Res. 3 [1927] Fla. Laws 1597.
58.

FLA. CONST. art. III, §21 (1885).

59. See text accompanying notes 73-78 infra.
60. S.J. Res. 582 [1933] Fla. Laws 881.
61. Id.
62. State ex rel. Matthews v. Alsop, 120 Fla. 628, 163 So. 80 (1933).
63. This construction was questioned by Justice Buford in State ex rel. Landis v. Ault,
129 Fla. 686, 176 So. 789 (1937). That case was decided on other grounds, however, and
the prior ruling stood.
64. Address by Osee R. Fagan, City Attorney, Gainesville, Fla., Fla. League of Municipalities Meeting, March 3, 1969.
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and towns by general law. Nevertheless the provisions of the 1984
amendment to Article III, Section 24, have never been of any force
and effect.
That the amendment would have made a difference is indisputable.
Whether it would have made a difference on the positive side of the ledger
is another matter. At least one article did not mourn its demise:6 5
Perhaps it deserves such a fate; attempts in other states at rigid general
laws for fixed population brackets have hardly produced scintillating
practical results.
The last of the amendments to be discussed came about in 1938 and
brought special and local laws relating to municipalities within the noticereferendum requirement of article III, section 21. This was done by adding
a specific reference to "any local or special law establishing or abolishing
municipalities, or providing for their government, jurisdiction and powers,
or altering or amending the same" to the proviso in the section establishing
the requirement for publication of notice or a referendum on special and
7
local bills.66 This amendment laid to rest the ruling of the McQuaid case,
which had for nearly fifty years permitted the passage of special legislation
relating to municipalities without compliance with the special procedural
requirements. Since the 1939 session of the legislature, the court has held
either notice or referendum to be a prerequisite to the validity of special
and local laws for municipalities.68
CLASSIICATIONS OF LEGISLATvE ACTS

In discussing the constitutional framework for the establishment of local
governments and the exercise of the state's sovereignty over them by the
legislature, three types of legislative enactments have been mentioned: general
laws, special laws, and local laws. General laws, as previously noted, must
be of uniform operation throughout the state. This does not, however,
mean that they must be universally applicable "to the whole and every
part of the state":69
A general law is one relating to subjects or persons or things as a
class, based upon proper distinctions and differences that inhere in,
or are peculiar or appropriate to, the class. A general law operates
universally throughout the state, or uniformly upon subjects as they
may exist in the state, or uniformly within permissible classifications.
Special or local laws relate to particular persons or things or are drafted
to apply to only a specified part of the state.7 0 In distinguishing them the
65. Dauer & Miller, supra note 54, at 420.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

S.J. Res. 81 [1937] Fla. Laws 1387.
State ex rel. McQuaid v. County Comm'rs, 23 Fla. 483, 3 So. 193 (1887).
Dauer & Miller, supra note 54, at 419.
State ex rel. Buford v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 99 So. 804 (1924).
Id.
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Florida supreme court described local laws as "relating to particular subdivisions or portions of the state, or to particular places of classified localities" and special laws as "relating to particular persons or things or other
particular objects of a class."'7 1 A law may also be held to be a special or
local law when drafted in general law form if impermissible classifications
72
are employed.
In addition to special and local laws, another form of legislation was
employed in dealing with local government matters. These enactments, known
as "general laws of local application," were described by the Florida supreme
court as "relating to subdivisions of the State or to Subjects or to persons
or things as a class based upon proper distinctions and differences that inhere in or are peculiar or appropriate to the class." 73 The most commonly
used basis of classification in these acts was population.
Population acts were used in place of special or local laws for various
reasons. The statute might have been intended to deal with a situation,
which at the time occurred in only one place but might also occur in other
areas in the future.74 Another suggested reason was that the scope of the
statute was so broad as to make compliance with the notice-referendum requirements for special and local laws impractical. 75 These suggested reasons
logically related to the supposed role of population acts, falling "between
the pure general laws and the pure special or local laws," 76 but bore no

relation to reality in the vast majority of cases. In fact, all but a few of
these acts contained population brackets drawn so narrowly as to apply
to only one county. Frequently, when the population bracket did encompass
more than one county, usually as a result of one or more counties having
grown into the bracket in a later census, exemptions were passed for all
but the originally intended county. Another prevalent practice was amendment of the population brackets every ten years to conform to the growth
of the county originally intended to be subject to the act.
The actual motivation for the use of the population act device probably
most often stemmed from the notice or referendum requirements and the
subject matter limitations placed on special and local laws. Before the 1968
constitutional revision, subject matter limitations on special and local laws
did not apply to general laws of local application. A legislator seeking to
circumvent the prohibitions could draw a population act on the subject so
designed as to apply only to the desired locale. A glance through the population acts in effect through 1970 reveals that this was apparently done

71. State ex rel. Buford v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 287, 99 So. 804, 809 (1924). The 1968
Revised Constitution drops the term "local" and defines "special law" as a special or
local law. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §12 (g).

72.
73.
74.
90, 91
75.
76.

E.g., State ex rel. Buford v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 99 So. 804 (1924).
State ex rel. Buford v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 287, 99 So. 804, 809 (1924).
Note, Florida's General Laws of Special or Local Application, 10 U. FLA. L. REV.
(1957).
Id.
Id. at 97.
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occasionally, although more than ninety per cent of the acts did not involve
7
such prohibited subjects.
Avoidance of the notice-referendum requirement was apparently the chief
reason for use of the population act. It provided a means of enacting a de
facto special or local law without the locale or group affected being apprised
beforehand of its nature.78 Various political motivations could have inspired such a move.
Such practices, however, were not without constitutional problems. In
the event of a challenge, it was the well established practice of the courts
to look to the language of the act or its context for its obvious purpose or
legal effect. Should it clearly appear to operate as a local or special act it
would be regarded as such, even though framed in the guise of a general
law by the legislature.79 In determining whether an act was in fact a general
law two main tests were employed:8 °
First, the act must be potentially applicable to any county. It
cannot by its own terms be forever limited to any one, or to any
particular group of counties ....
The second main requirement is that there must be some reasonable basis for the classification based on population.
In determining potential future applicability of an act, the first requisite
was language that did not limit the applicability of the population brackets
to the last census taken before its passage. The courts also looked to the
entire act to make certain that none of its provisions so limited it. An
example of an act that was impermissibly limited was one that authorized
a special election to be held within thirty days after its effective date in the
counties of a certain population bracketB1 Although the language relative
to the population brackets referred to the "last federal census," which had
been held to be progressive,82 the limitation of the operation of the act to
a fixed time, in effect, had frozen its applicability to the one county in that
bracket at the time of passage.
The question of the reasonableness of population as the basis of classification became a more significant question after 1928. Prior to the amendment
of article III, section 21, in that year a finding on reasonableness was not
necessarily determinative in the case because the legislature was deemed sole
judge on the matter of prior publication of notice of intention to introduce
a local law. 3 If a law were held void as a general law, it would still be

77. FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE SERVICE BuaEAu, A NUMEuCAL

COMPILATION

OF POPULATION

Acts (1970).
78. Note, supra note 74, at 91.
79. Anderson v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 102 Fla. 695, 136 So. 334 (1931).
80.

Batchelor, Population Statutes Under the Florida Constitution, 1 U. MAMI L. REv.

97, 99-100 (1947).
81. Anderson v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 102 Fla. 695, 136 So. 334 (1931).
82. State ex rel. Buford v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 99 So. 804 (1924).
83. Stockton v. Powell, 29 Fla. 1, 10 So. 688 (1892).
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operative as a local law, since the courts would not inquire into the procedures by which it was passed. This was not true after 1928.
The test of reasonableness of a classification requires that the classification
have a reasonable basis in different characteristics, conditions, situations, or
other practical considerations affecting the subject matter of the act.84 It
appears that the test has been more stringently applied when the population
classification was bracketed by a maximum and a minimum figure than
when it included all counties above or below a given figure. 85 It should also
be noted that the test has been applied on a standard of good faith rather
than wisdom, and if any state of facts could reasonably be conceived to
sustain a classification, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law
86

was enacted has been assumed.

Despite the presumption of validity given legislation and the liberality of
application of the tests by the courts, the concensus has been that the overwhelming majority of population acts passed were probably unconstitutional.
The numbers of these laws in effect provided a clear illustration that the
mechanics of providing for local governments as established by the constitution were defective. The passage of "quasi-local" laws in the form of
population acts enabled the legislature to slip through a loophole, circumventing the subject matter and notice and referendum requirements on
local bills. Since floor passage of population acts, like local bills, was usually
automatic if the bill was supported by the delegation from the affected
area, the effect was to give almost complete control over local governments
to the legislative delegations. Thus, while decisions were controlled by local
men, the locus of decisionmaking power was shifted away from the people
and into the cumbersome and for local purposes, remote legislative process.
This was because:

87

There [was] no express provision in the Florida Constitution relative
to the right of local self-government, the right of self-government as
to local affairs - the so-called doctrine of "home rule" as applied to
cities and towns -having apparently not met with much favor in
the state.
Throughout the era of Florida government under the 1885 constitution,
"Dillon's Rule,"88 not home rule, held sway. The authority of local governments in all matters, including those purely local, was limited to that expressly granted by the legislature, or that which could be necessarily implied
ifrom an express grant. As to municipalities, the Florida supreme court
consistently held:8 9

84. State ex rel. Maxwell Hunter, Inc. v. O'Quinn, 114 Fla. 222, 154 So. 166 (1934).
85. Batchelor, supra note 80, at 102.
86. Anderson v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 102 Fla. 695, 136 So. 334 (1931).
87. 6 FLA. JuR. Constitutional Law §109 (1956), citing State ex rel. Johnson v. Johns,
92 Fla. 187, 109 So. 228 (1926); Pursley v. Ft. Myers, 87 Fla. 428, 100 So. 366 (1924).
88. The term "Dillon's Rule" has been applied to the rule of law set out below, which
was enunciated in 1 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoaRoRTIONS §237 (5th ed. 1911).
89. Malone v. City of Quincy, 66 Fla. 52, 56-57, 62 So. 922, 924 (1913).
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Municipalities are legal entities for local governmental purposes and
they can exercise only such authority as is conferred by express or implied provisions of law. The existence of authority to act cannot be
assumed, but it should be made to appear . . . . If reasonable
doubt exists as to a particular power of a municipality it should be
resolved against the City.
Similarly, the rule as to counties was stated: 90
Counties have no inherent power, but derive their powers wholly
from the sovereign state. . . The exercise of power granted to
counties must be in accord with the grant, and any doubt as to the
grant or the extent of the powers granted should be resolved against
the county asserting the power.
The growth in range and volume of provisions relating to local governments that this article has traced in Florida's constitutional history was probably equally illustrative of two concurrent phenomena. First, there was the
increasing demand for local governmental services felt as Florida attained
statehood and settlements gradually gave way to towns and cities. This was
matched by the widening influence throughout the nineteenth century of
the legal concepts that were formulated into Dillon's Rule in the latter part
of the century. The doctrine was reflected in at least four United States
Supreme Court decisions on the status of municipalities spanning from 1815
to 1923.91
EMERGENCE OF THE HOME RULE CONCEPT
While influence of Dillon's Rule grew and dominated the American local
government scene, the nineteenth century also saw the early beginnings of
a new concept. This concept was called "home rule" and it was ultimately
to be adopted in some form in a strong majority of the states. The modern
home rule movement dates from the appearance of the first home rule statute
in Iowa in 1851, followed by adoption of the first self-executing constitutional
provision by Missouri in 1875.92
Individual states have taken various approaches in the adoption and implementation of home rule. State practices have been classified on the basis
of the scope of the grant of local powers and curtailment of state legislative
control. 93 Three main categories have emerged. In order of decreasing
strength they are: self-executing or mandatory constitutional home rule,
permissive or non-self-executing home rule, and legislative home rule.94

90. 8 FLA. JuR. Counties §7 (1956), citing Amos v. Matthews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308 (1930);
Williams v. Dunnellon, 125 Fla. 114, 169 So. 631 (1936).
91. LEGisLATrE RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT RELATrVE To MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (PROPOSED CONSTITUTONAL AMENDMENT). Mass. Sen. Doc. No. 950, at 36 (March 10, 1965) [hereinafter cited as MASS. SEN. Doe.].

92. Id. at 14.
93. Id. at 42.
94. Id.
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Constitutional self-executing home rule provisions may follow one of
four different approaches. First, they may spell out detailed procedures whereby localities may adopt, amend or revise their charters,
without necessity for supplementary state legislation. Secondly, such provisions may spell out some chartermaking procedures or certain procedural principles, while requiring the legislature to provide by general
law for other aspects. Thirdly, the constitution may not prescribe
particular charter writing procedures, but may instead require the
legislature to enact general laws which (a) grant home rule powers to
localities. (b) provide a chartermaking process for local use, or (c) both.
Fourthly, the constitution may be silent on the subject of charters and
may simply grant home rule powers to localities with respect to their
local affairs and government; these powers may be few in number and
broadly stated, or may be enumerated in specific detail.
Frequently, the benefits of self-executing home rule are restricted
to those local governments which adopt a home rule charter. Most
self-executing home rule provisions either prohibit enactments of
special local laws by the legislature altogether, or permit such laws
only upon request or subject to approval by the local community concerned. 95
The second type, "permissive" constitutional home rule, is usually a
compromise resulting from judicial invalidation of legislative home rule as
an unconstitutional delegation of power, local demand for a degree of autonomy, and legislative reluctance to give way to self-executing proposals. 96 It
is, then, little more than constitutionally authorized legislative home rule.
The weakest of the three main types, legislative home rule, is based
solely on statutory grant or procedural requirements of legislative rules.97
As previously mentioned, it is subject to attack as an unconstitutional delegation of power. In addition to the possibility of being struck down by the
courts, it may also be withdrawn by subsequent legislative act. 98 Frequently,
while it may not be repealed, the legislature will ignore it and continue to
legislate in local matters. 99 Since home rule is merely statutory itself, the
later statutes are of equal dignity and therefore supercede the home rule
provisions.
Home rule provisions have also been classified on the basis of the constitutional approach taken to the allocation of functions and powers between
local and state governments. 00 This is done generally by distinguishing between an emphasis on a separation of powers approach and a shared powers
approach. The separation of powers approach attempts to reserve matters
of local and statewide concern to the respective levels of government. When
left without enumeration this approach presents problems with either constitutional enumeration of local matters or judicial definition of local con-

95. Id. at 43.
96. Id. at 44.
97. Id.
98. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv.
269, 276 (1968).
99. Id.
100.

MASS. SEN.

Doc.

at 44.
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cerns where left without enumeration.1 1 The shared powers approach permits greater flexibility but thereby results in a greater degree of legislative
control. All of these types of home rule operate, however, within the context
of general legislation for the establishment of statewide guidelines for local
governments. Complete autonomy is not contemplated by home rule and the
state retains "a general supervisory responsibility
for its political
subdivisions"' 0 2 as an inherent attribute of its sovereignty.
In whatever form adopted, if truly effective, home rule proponents argue
that it will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of state legislatures by
providing more time for deliberation of statewide policy matters; decrease
state interference in internal affairs and legislative "log-rolling"; eliminate
the necessity of waiting for a legislative session to convene to remedy local
problems; provide the greater potential powers for cities needed to cope
with the greater demands of an urbanized society; be psychologically advantageous in that it will foster an increased sense of civic responsibility;
and is only rational, since consideration before passage of desired local legislation is usually only pro forma anyway and local self-government is con03
sistent with American traditions:
IMPETUS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

IN FLORIDA

These arguments were well received in Florida in the late 1960's as, with
court-ordered reapportionment, the tempo of reform in state government
quickened. The single most significant change came with the ratification
by the people of a revised constitution on November 5, 1968. This constitution contained, within its article VIII, which was voted on separately, a
very different philosophical approach to local government powers and their
relationship to state government. This change was deemed necessary because
of the problems that had arisen from operating under an eighty-year old
constitution in the Florida of the Space Age.
Part of the situation was summarized succinctly in a 1968 legislative
staff report: 04
Since the conclusion of the Second World War, and particularly during
the boom of the 1950's, Florida experienced the development of substantial population centers in areas that were formerly unincorporated
portions of the various counties. As population groups in these housing
developments and subdivisions increased, the need for governmental
services, such as sewers, water, police, drainage and zoning, became an
increasing necessity. The people in these areas, frequently dissatisfied
101. Id.
102. Id. at 45. One additional type of home rule can be distinguished. This type
operates solely as a restriction on the state legislative power by requiring local approval
of special statutes by referendum or by the affected local government. Called "negative
home rule," it may be found either standing alone or in conjunction with one of the
three "positive" types. Id.
103. Vanlandingham, supra note 98, at 270-71.
104. Staff of Fla. House Comm. on Local Government Efficiency and Organization,
Local Government Jurisdictions in Florida 2-3 (Staff Paper No. 1, mimeo., Aug. 1968).
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with the limited services of county governments, pursued independent
courses of action and incorporated themselves into new municipalities.
These same factors, to a large extent, contributed to the development
of special taxing districts. Under the Constitution and the General
Laws of the State of Florida, counties are unable to provide many
services which population centers often require. In cases such as these,
where a need for a particular service, such as fire protection, street
lighting or sewers, was required, and the residents of the area did not
desire to join an existing municipality or form a municipality of their
own, the vehicle of a special tax district was utilized to permit the area
to establish the required service.
These special tax districts were, like counties and cities, creatures of the
state and limited to their legislatively authorized powers. They were created
by special act or pursuant to general enabling acts, with the vast majority
being of the former class. 0 5 Similarly, most districts were organized for a
single purpose' 0 6 and it was not uncommon for them to have boundaries
overlapping districts created for other purposes or boundaries coextensive
with those of a county. The only limitation placed on county-wide districts
was that they were prohibited from taxing for "county purposes."'1 7
The acute obsolescence of the general local governments provided for
by the 1885 constitution was apparent from the fact that by 1968 the number
of these special tax districts had grown to an estimated 1,000 exclusive of
school districts. 08 The rapid increase in the number of these tax districts
was not the only indication that the 1885 scheme of local government was
long overdue for retirement. The number of local bills introduced in the
legislature had reached 2,107 in 1965.109 Also, the number of population
acts on the books was growing equally rapidly." 0 Like the special tax districts, most of these local and population acts owed their existence to the
inadequacy of the powers of local governments under the existing constitutional and general law framework.
Several changes in the direction of home rule had been made to the
1885 system prior to 1968, with varying degrees of success. The first of these
changes came about in 1915"' and has been dismissed by at least one commentator as being of no practical significance."' The 1915 act, a general
law chapter on municipal charter amendment, provided a very limited degree of legislative home rule for cities. The first section of the chapter
limited the scope of the grant to modification of local government struc-

105.
106.

Note, Special District Taxation, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 531, 534 (1960).
Id. at 533.

107.

Crowder v. Philips, 146 Fla. 428, 442, 1 So. 2d 629, 631 (1941).

108. Staff of Fla. House Comm. on Local Government Efficiency and Organization, supra
note 104, at 3.

109.

FLORIDA

JOINT LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY OF LEGISLATION

1972

MANAGEMENT

COMM.,

LEGISLATIVE

REGULAR SESSION FLORIDA LEGISLATURE

INFORMATION

DIV.,

Supp. 1 (1972).

110. The number had reached over 2,100 by 1970 with over 1,300 having been enacted
after the effective date of the 1960 census. FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE SERVICE BUREAU supra note 77.

111. Law of June 4, 1915, ch. 6940, §§1-15 [1915] Fla. Laws 312-18.
112. Vanlandingham, supra note 98, at 273-74.
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tures, election procedures, and mode of exercise of existing powers. 1 3 This
language was duly noted by the Florida supreme court in an early, unanimous
decision involving a city's attempt to expand its powers under the 1915 act."14
A careful analysis of the first section of the act will reveal that the
purpose of the Legislature was to authorize any city or town to change
its form of government or method of exercising the jurisdiction and
powers already granted to it by legislative enactment. No city or town
was authorized by that act to enlarge its corporate powers beyond
limitations prescribed by law, as the proviso to the section dearly
indicates.
Although having been so limited and thereby reduced to minimal effectiveness, the 1915 act did avoid a fate not uncommon to legislative home
rule acts, a finding of unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.": 5
Further reducing its significance was the fact that utilization of the Act
was hampered by a rather cumbersome procedure. 116 In contrast, a special
act required only, in practical terms, the approval of the local legislative
delegation and was not confined to the limited scope of the 1915 act.
The next change to appear was to ultimately have an important impact,
resulting in implementation of the first county home rule provision in
Florida's history. This was the adoption in 1956 of a new article VIII, section
11 of the 1885 constitution authorizing the electors of Dade County to
"adopt, revise, and amend from time to time a home rule charter government for Dade County.""17 Subsequently, on May 21, 1957, the people of
Dade County approved a home rule charter establishing a metropolitan
government with a county manager as chief executive and an expanded
county commission exercising broader legislative powers." 8 As mandated by
the constitutional amendment, municipalities were granted charter-making
powers of their own," 9 resulting in what has been described as a "three-level
20
federation."
Of these three levels, the state remained at the top, retaining supremacy
through the constitution and general laws except where there was express
authority to the contrary in the home rule amendment. In cases of potential
2
conflict a strict construction of the authorizing amendment was mandated.' '
The general grant of power to the county government was authorized to
cover "the affairs, property and government of Dade County.112 2 Finally,

113. FLA. STAT. §166.01 (1971).
114. Pursley v. City of Ft. Myers, 87 Fla. 428, 430-31, 100 So. 366, 367 (1924).
115. State ex tel. Brown v. Emerson, 126 Fla. 576, 171 So. 663 (1936).
116. FLA. STAT. §§166.01-.15 (1971).
117. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §11 (1956).
118. Alloway, Constitutional Law, 4th Survey of Florida Law, 14 U. MIAmi L. REv.
501, 517 (1960).
119. FLA. CONsT. art. VII, §11 (1) (g) (1956).
120. Comment, Constitutional Revision: County Home Rule in Florida-The Need
for Expansion, 19 U. FiA. L. REv. 282, 286 (1966).
121. FA. CoNsT. art. VIII, §11 (9) (1956).
122. FA. CoNsTr. art. VII, §11 (1) (b) (1956).
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the provisions of the amendment relative to the preservation of municipal
123
powers were construed by the Florida supreme court in this manner:
[W]e construe the . . . Home Rule Amendment as requiring the
[Metropolitan] Charter to provide for municipal autonomy as to the
purely local functions or powers of the municipalities in Dade County;
and as authorizing regulation and control by the Board on a countywide basis of those municipal functions and services that are susceptible
to, and could be most effectively carried on under, a uniform plan of
regulation applicable to the county as a whole.
Two additional points should be noted. First, the legislature was required
by the amendment to legislate for Dade County and its municipalities only
by general laws applying to at least one or more other counties or municipalities in the state.124 Second, an enumerated powers-type charter was employed, apparently in an attempt to insure some effective home rule within
the constraints of the constitutional atmosphere in Florida.
The Dade County home rule amendment, like three others affecting local
government structures, was carried forward in the 1968 revision and remains
in effect today. 25 The others did not relate to home rule, but authorized
consolidation of county with city governments by state legislative act with
local referenda in Duval County-Jacksonville" 26 and Monroe County-Key
West,12 7 and city with county government by a slightly different procedure
in Tampa-Hillsborough County. 8 The Jacksonville consolidation, accom-

plished in 1967, was the only one of these amendments implemented before
1968.
THE

1968 REvisiON

Such a patchwork amendatory process as evidenced by the above mentioned
consolidation and home rule amendments, which are analogous in a sense
to special and population act changes in local government powers and structures, should not have to be resorted to again. The 1968 Revised Constitution
is drawn flexibly enough and grants enough local autonomy to provide for
most situations that previously required such measures.
HOME

RULE UNDER THE REVIsED

CONSTITUTION

OF

1968

The home rule provisions of the 1968 Revised Constitution are found in

123. Miami Shores Village v. Cowart, 108 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1958).
124. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §11 (6) (1956).

125. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §6 (1968).
126. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §9 (1934).
127.

FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §10 (1936).

128. FLA. CONsr. art. VIII, §24 (1966). An election was held in November 1972 on a
charter promulgated by the state legislature pursuant to article VIII, §3 of the 1968 Revised
Constitution, which would have consolidated all city and county government in Hillsborough.
As in two prior attempts at adopting a charter under the authority of the 1966 amendment, the electorate rejected the charter.
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article VIII, Local Government. Other provisions important to the concept
appear in article III dealing with the powers of the legislature. Typically,
the Florida home rule approach does not contemplate complete autonomy of
local governments, and their powers in terms of other state functions such
as taxation, education, judiciary, and elections are dealt with in separate
articles. The thrust of the Florida home rule movement is a redistribution
of the charter-making and legislative powers as they relate to matters of
local concern.
Sections 10 and 11 of article III are addressed to the question of special
legislation and, for the first time in a Florida constitution, general laws of
local application. Section 10 is derived from article III, section 21, of the
1885 Constitution and preserves the notice-referendum requirement for special
laws. In an editorial change, only the term "special law" appears in this
section though it is later defined to mean a special or local law. 129 In another
change procedural details of the manner of publication are eliminated from
the organic law and are to be provided by general law. Under the schedule
provisions 3 9 the old constitutional provisions were carried forward as general
131
law.
Section 11 is, primarily, a derivation of article III, section 20, of the
1885 Constitution. It lists the subject matter prohibitions for special laws,
incorporating a number of minor changes including the exception from the
prohibitions of laws relating to election, jurisdiction or duties of officers of
chartered counties, special districts, and local agencies in addition to municipal officers, which was the only comparable exception in the 1885 provision.
An important change is that the listing of prohibited subject matter is also
made applicable to general laws of local application. Two important new
provisions also appear in section 11. Subsection (a) (21) builds flexibility into the constitution by providing for expansion of the subject matter prohibitions by general law passed by three-fifths vote of the membership of
each house. Finally, subsection (b) accords constitutional status to the requirement, long imposed by the courts, 32 that the basis of classification in
general laws be related to the subject matter of the law.
These changes to article III, while not directly bearing on home rule
powers, represent a significant narrowing of the scope of permissible general
laws of local application and their most abused sub-type, population acts. 33
Taken in conjunction with the new home rule provisions, they fit into an
over-all design to take local decisions out of the legislature and put them into
the hands of local officials who are in closer contact with the people affected.

A New Constitutional Article on Local Government
The heart of home rule in Florida is now found in subsections 1 (f), 1 (g),

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

FA. CONSr. art. X, §12(g) (1968).
FLA. CONST. art. XII, §10 (1968).
FLA. STAT. §11.021 (1971).
State ex rel. Maxwell Hunter, Inc. v. O'Quinn, 114 Fla. 222, 154 So. 166 (1934).
Op. ATr'Y G N. FLA. 069-17, March 25, 1969.
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and 2 (b) of article VIII. The subsections apply to non-charter counties,
charter counties, and municipalities respectively. The latter two provisions
are of the self-executing type while the former is non-self-executing. Even in
the broad grants to cities and charter counties, however, state legislative
supremacy is retained by proviso.
As the most limited of these three provisions, the non-charter county
subsection represents a significant difference in its final form from the Constitutional Revision Commission draft. The commission's recommendation
was that "counties shall have the power of self-government except as otherwise provided by general or special law."' 134 In final form as adopted, the
1 35

constitution states:

Counties not operating under county charters shall have such power of
self-government as is provided by general or special law. The board of
county commissioners of a county not operating under a charter may
enact, in a manner prescribed by general law, county ordinances not
inconsistent with general or special law, but an ordinance in conflict
with a municipal ordinance shall not be effective within the municipality to the extent of such conflict.
Governmental organization in non-charter counties is as provided for in
article VIII, sections 1 (d) and 1 (e), on officers and commissioners, respectively,
and in general law.
Florida's first general constitutional provision for the adoption of county
government charters appears as subsection 1 (c). It permits the establishment
of a charter government pursuant to general or special law. The charter
itself is to be "adopted, amended, or repealed only upon vote of the electors
of the county in a special election called for that purpose." 136 The general
sections on officers and commissioners, mentioned above, contain provisos
excepting charter government from their operation. Powers for charter counties
Revision Commission with only
are as recommended by the Constitutional
137
editorial changes in the final text:
Counties operating under county charters shall have all powers of
local self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special
law approved by vote of the electors. The governing body of a county
operating under a charter may enact county ordinances not inconsistent
with general law. The charter shall provide which shall prevail in
the event of conflict between county and municipal ordinances.
Among the differences between this provision and the one dealing with
non-charter counties are the allowance for a charter provision making county
ordinances controlling over municipal ordinances and the fact that charter
county ordinances are not controlled by special laws unless the special law

134.

26A F.S.A. 270 (1970).

135.

FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §1 ()

136.

FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §1 (c) (1968).
FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §1 (g) (1968).

137.

(1968).
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is approved by referendum. More significant is the language in which the
grant of powers is cast. Charter government powers are given in terms of a
broad home rule authority. This is pointed out by this commentary in Florida
8
Statutes Annotated:" a
Counties operating under a charter are presumptively considered to
have the broad powers of self-government . . . unless provided otherwise by general law or by the special law adopting the charter. Thus,
charter counties and non-charter counties apparently start from different poles in their relationships with legislative enactments. Both could
conceivably, be the same depending on the legislation adopted.
Powers of municipalities are roughly equivalent to those of charter
counties, though the language is different. While specific language providing
that "municipalities shall have the power of self government" was deleted
from the Constitutional Revision Commission's proposal, the basic impact
of the proposal was not greatly affected: 3 9
The apparent difference is that under the new language, all municipalities have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers unless
provided otherwise by law, whereas under the 1885 Constitution, municipalities had only those powers expressly granted by law.
Again, state legislative supremacy is retained and in this case, the exception
to home rule power is broader than in the charter county provision. Municipalities are granted the "exercise [of] any power for municipal purposes
except as otherwise provided by law."140 Therefore, municipal home rule
may be limited by general law, special law, or general law of local application. 41 The argument has also been raised that this language may make
municipal home rule powers subject to limitations found in decisional or
42
common law or both.
Article VIII contains two other sections of importance to the reform of
local government in Florida. Section 3 provides for consolidation of the
governments of a county and any one or more municipalities located therein.
Consolidation plans may be proposed only by special law and may be approved
either by vote of the electors of the county, or of the county and municipalities
as specified in the special law. Section 4 provides procedure for the transfer
or contracting out of any function of a county, municipality, or special district to another county, municipality, or special district.

138. 26A FS.A. 271 (1970).
139. Id. at 292.
140. FLA.CONsr. art. VIII, §2 (b) (1968).
141. The section on municipalities includes two other important subsections. Subsection 2 (a) provides for establishment or abolition of municipalities and amendment of
their charters pursuant to general or special law. Subsection 2 (c) directs that annexation
of unincorporated territory, merger of municipalities, and extra-territorial exercise of
municipal powers shall be provided for by general or special law.
142. Staff Memorandum to members of the House Committee on Local Government,
Dec. 16, 1968.
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Returning to the focal question of home rule powers, provisions such as
Florida's, where the legislature retains the ultimate authority to determine
their scope, have been said to be subject to the same criticisms as legislative
3
home rule.14
To the extent that the legislature retains unlimited or virtually unlimited authority to supersede an exercise of municipal initiative conferred by the constitution, there is only a semantic difference between
constitutional and legislative home rule, at least when the latter is
defined in broad terms.
Another author, in discussing the same problem, noted that factors other
than the precise language employed in constitutional provisions play an
important role in the ultimate success or failure of any attempt at achieving
home rule:'"
In evaluating the legislative supremacy type of provision one must
note that it has enjoyed mixed success, apparently succeeding in some
states, though not in others. Perhaps to understand the reason for
this mixed success one needs to recall the observation of Thomas H.
Reed that home rule is a "state of mind." In other words, where home
rule of this kind has succeeded, conditions generally have been favorable to it. . . . [A] state having a long history of undue legislative
interference in municipal affairs . . . might do well not to adopt
this kind of provision.
It was this type of history in Florida that prompted the following remark
45
from Mr. Osee R. Fagan, City Attorney of Gainesville:'
If the Courts, the Legislature and municipal officials are of the view
that local government is intended to be strengthened by this new
document, this new provision can have profound and lasting effect in
our urban society, but if only the wording of our Constitution is
changed and "business continues as usual" then the potential for the
development of truly responsible local government in Florida will be
lost.
Immediately following adoption of the 1968 Revised Constitution, the
precise legal effect of its language retaining state legislative supremacy over
home rule powers was a source of considerable uncertainty. Debatably, this
remains so today. There appears to have been substantial agreement that
the general intent of the constitutional provisions was to secure broad home
rule powers for Florida's local governments. The apprehension seems to have
centered around the question of how effectively that goal had been accomplished in the face of continued state legislative supremacy, as manifested
in legislation already on the books and in the potential for future limiting

143.
Courts,
144.
145.

Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 699 n.102 (1964).
Vanlandingham, supra note 98, at 296.
Address by Osee R. Fagan, supra note 64, at 1-2.
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enactments. City Attorney Fagan summarizes his impression of the consti148
tutional changes:
The net effect then of the 1968 Constitution is to grant municipalities
any power for municipal purposes directly from the people, but the legislature is also given all power to limit the authority of the people's
grant by general or special law. The end result then is that cities are
granted all powers for municipal purposes, and legislative acts may
only be effective to limit or restrict such power. Article VIII, Section
6 of the 1968 Constitution continues the status of municipalities, their
power, jurisdiction and government, until changed in accordance with
law. Such provision would seem to continue in full force and effect
all general and special laws which limit or restrict in any way the grant
of authority contained in Article VIII, Section 2 (b). The authority of
the legislature as to municipalities has not been changed by the 1968
Constitution, but absent any general or special legislation or constitutional restriction on a given subject of municipal authority, the
power already is vested in municipalities by direct grant from the
people.
It should be noted here that such is not the case for chartered
counties as provided for in Article VIII, Section 1 (g) of the 1968
Constitution. Once a county is chartered and the charter ratified by
the people such county "shall have all powers of local self-government
not inconsistent with general law" and special or local laws are not
effective to limit, curtail, restrict or amend such power unless approved
by vote of the electors. It seems somewhat incongruous that counties
in Florida, which have never had charter powers (except those given
in the Constitution such as to Dade and Duval), be now given more
autonomy than municipalities who have always exercised charter
authority.
Another authority in the field voiced views similar to, and relied on in
part by, Fagan. The Honorable Paul W. Danahy, Jr., member of the Florida
House of Representatives from Tampa and Chairman of the then House
Committee on Local Government, stated in a memorandum to the member147
ship of the House:
It is no longer necessary for municipalities to secure legislation to perform municipal functions or exercise powers for municipal purposes,
as long as the exercise of these functions or powers is not prohibited
by general or special law. The term "municipal purpose" will probably
never be fully defined, but generally it is any power previously granted
by the Legislature and upheld by the courts. All previously granted
powers have been continued under a grandfather clause in the new
constitution. It is my view that the broad grant under the "municipal
powers" clause in the new constitution also automatically adds any
powers the Legislature could give to a municipality. In other words,
a municipality need not seek legislation unless it is needed to remove
a specific prohibition against performing a function; the absence of a
specific prohibition means that the municipality may proceed in the
manner deemed appropriate at the local level.
146. Id. at 13-14.
147. Memorandum from Representative Paul W. Danahy to members of the Fla. House
of Representatives, Feb. 18, 1969.
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A somewhat less optimistic view of the effectiveness of the constitutional
provisions standing alone was voiced by Mr. Ralph Marsicano, counsel to
the Florida League of Municipalities, in a general brief on the subject of
148
home rule under the 1968 Revised Constitution:
If a municipality should seek to exercise a power which is already provided by general or special law, and since such law would not be inconsistent with the new constitution as provided in Section 6 (a),
Article XII, it follows that the particular power to be exercised by the
municipality would apparently have to be exercised within the bounds
of and only in the manner set forth in the existing law.
Obviously, there are many provisions of general law dealing with
municipal powers

. . . and hundreds of special charter provisions

and special acts authorizing municipalities to perform certain functions, usually in a restricted manner. Therefore it appeared that if
municipalities wished to exercise any power for municipal purposes
where there was already a law on the books relating to the subject, it
could only be exercised in the restricted manner provided, and since
there was so much existing law, both general and special, relating to
municipal powers, there would be very little that municipalities could
accomplish under the constitutional grant of home rule powers.
What appeared to be another limitation on municipal home rule was
the subject of a second brief by Mr. Mariscano, written shortly after the
first. In discussing charter amendment powers, he noted the division of that
specific power into a separate subsection, apart from the general powers
clause. His ultimate conclusion was that this would preclude charter amendment under the general powers clause and restrict it to amendment pursuant
149
to general or special law:
[R]eading Article VIII, Subsections 2(a) and 2(b) together, there should
be little doubt but that there was reserved to the Legislature the power
to prescribe the form of government for municipalities and that there
was no intention to grant power to amend charters under the home
rule provisions of Subsection (b).
Implementing Legislation

Agreement was virtually unanimous that legislation was needed to clarify
the scope of the home rule powers intended under the constitution and the
extent to which the legislature intended to permit their exercise or to limit
them. Legislation was forthcoming in the 1969 regular session. Enacted into
law were: general law procedures for adoption of county charters, 150 powers
of self-government for all counties, 151 procedures for the enactment of county

148. Memorandum from Ralph A. Marsicano to members of the Florida League of
Municipalities, July 24, 1969.
149. Memorandum from Ralph A. Marsicano to members of the Florida League of
Municipalities, Aug. 4, 1969.
150. FLA. STAT. §§125.60-.64 (1971).
151. Ch. 69-234 [1969] Fla. Laws 923-24.
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ordinances,' 52 home rule powers for municipalities, 53 and a general law
delegating the authority to promulgate charter amendments to the municipal
governing bodies. 54
Chapter 69-45 provides a general law method for adoption of a county
charter, pursuant to article VIII, section 1 (c). Appearing in Florida Statutes,
sections 125.60-.64, the law contemplates an eleven- to fifteen-member citizen
commission to be appointed by the county's legislative delegation upon
request, by resolution of the county commission, or petition of fifteen per cent
of the county's qualified electors. It provides for payment of expenses, public
meetings and hearings, and time limits within which a proposed charter
must be presented. The proposal, as required by the constitution, must be
submitted to the electorate of the county for adoption or rejection. If the
proposal is rejected, the law forbids any new charter referendum for a period
of two years. County charters have been proposed and adopted under both
this general law method and pursuant to special acts. Plans for replacement
of the present general law system with one less cumbersome are being formulated for the 1973 legislative session. Also being considered is the provision in
155
general law of several optional charters from which counties can choose.
Chapter 69-234, which became section 125.65 of the Florida Statutes, was
the legislature's initial response to the language of article VIII, section 1, on
the power of self-government of counties. Applying to both charter and
non-charter counties, the statutory language was quite similar to that of
article VIII, section 2 (b) on the general powers of municipalities.
As a necessary adjunct to the provision of home rule powers for noncharter counties, chapter 69-32, now Florida Statutes, sections 125.66-.68,
provides a general law procedure for enactment of county ordinances. The
differences in language between sections 1 (f) and 1 (g) of the constitution
raise a question as to whether charter counties would be bound to follow the
general law procedures. Since reasonable general law procedures were promptly
provided, there has been no reason to test this distinction. In the event the
general law procedures were amended so as to become unduly burdensome
or were repealed altogether, the question would become highly significant.
In any case it appears clear that the constitution secures for charter counties
authority to enact ordinances, while the authority of non-charter counties in
the absence of any general law procedure would be at least doubtful.
Two measures relating to the powers of municipalities were enacted by
the 1969 legislature. The first, chapter 69-33, dealt with general powers and
the second, chapter 69-242, provided a method for proposal of charter amendments by city ordinance. The language of chapter 69-33, appearing as section
167.005, Florida Statutes, is for the most part just a restatement of the constitutional powers clause. Added is a subsection, which also appeared in the
county home rule powers law that states: 56
152.
153.
154.
155.
Affairs,
156.

FLA. STAT. §§125.66-.68
FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

(1971).
§167.005 (1971).

§166.17 (1971).

Interview with Mr. John Wesley White, Staff Director, Committee on Community
Fla. House of Representatives, in Tallahassee, Fla., June 9, 1972.
FLA. STAT. §167.005(2) (1971).
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The provisions of this section shall be so construed as to secure for
municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the
constitution.
Also different is the precise language with regard to limitation of home
rule powers by state legislative action. This change was seen as significant by
1 57
Mr. Ralph Marsicano, in his brief on general municipal home rules powers:
Unquestionably, the legislature intended that there would be considerable difference in the meaning of the clause "except when prohibited
by general or special law," the language of the statute, as compared
with the clause "except as otherwise provided by law" in the constitutional grant of power. The purpose of the statute was to delineate
and clarify the constitutional municipal authority which the legislature
did not desire to restrict, but which under the constitution it had the
power to restrict ...
Unless a general law, a charter provision or a special act contains
language that clearly and definitely states that a certain municipal
power shall not be exercised, then a municipality may validly exercise any such power for municipal purposes.
Therefore, under this interpretation, an old statute providing for the
exercise of some municipal power in a narrowly restrictive manner would
not operate as a prohibition of the exercise of that same power in some
other manner. Only a clear prohibition would limit the home rule power.
Unfortunately, these distinctions were subtle ones and, while no court has
overruled the above interpretation, the statute itself was not a sufficiently
strong statement to overcome years of habit.
The final 1969 act to be discussed was addressed to the narrow question
of municipal charter amendment. It merely added an alternative method of
proposing amendments. Appearing as Florida Statutes, section 166.17, it did
away with the necessity of electing a charter commission by permitting proposal of amendments by resolution of the municipal governing body. It
provides an efficient, effective legislative home rule over charter amendment,
within the scheme of the 1968 Constitution. It does not, however, clear up
all problems in relation to municipal charters that remain as hangovers from
the 1885 scheme. The crux of the matter is that while the 1968 document
draws a dichotomy between charter powers, meant to relate only to form of
government, and general home rule powers, there was no such distinction in
the 1885 Constitution. Due to this dichotomy, and also because the prevalent
methods of providing general powers and making and amending charters
were the same, and all required specific legislative authority, a municipality's
charter invariably included matters relating to both form of government and
powers. It is such powers as these, which should now be within the purview
of home rule but are frozen into city charters amendable only pursuant to
the general or special acts, that continue to create problems.

157.

Memorandum, supra note 148, at 3, 7.
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It was a problem of this nature that arose in Ciocca v. Summerlin,158
where the Ft. Pierce city commission attempted to increase its compensation
above that provided in the city charter. Though one of the specifically
mentioned subject areas of the pre-1968 general law on charter amendment,
compensation would not generally be thought of as relating to the form or
organization of government. Its presence in the charter amendment statute
should be attributed, then, to the lack of any definition at that time of what
would be appropriate subject matter for a charter under a home rule scheme
of government. Needless to say, the ordinance was ruled invalid on the
grounds of conflict with chapter 166 and the city charter. The ruling was
not appealed.2 9 What may be needed to resolve this dilemma is a statutory
redefinition of the term "municipal charter" to comport with the current
home rule philosophy. If this could be achieved, home rule could be a much
more effective vehicle for the state's cities. How the role of a charter should
differ under a home rule provision such as Florida's and the advantages to
be gained thereby were the subject of one writer's comment: 1 0
[MgUnicipalties need only to lobby to prevent enactment of inimical
egislation in order to protect home rule prerogatives. Further, since
they permit a home rule city to exercise all powers not forbidden by
charter or by state law, the charter serves only as an instrument to
limit municipal action. In contrast to a charter which is considered a
grant of power, wherein municipal powers and functions must be
stated in great detail, a charter of this character should not only be
less difficult to draft, but also should broaden the sphere of home rule
authority.
One other significant step was taken by the 1969 legislature. By the
requisite three-fifths vote of both houses, pursuant to article III, section
11(a)(21) of the constitution, a prohibition against enactment of special
laws or general laws of local application pertaining to the compensation of
specified county officials was adopted,' 6 ' thus halting one of the most frequent
abuses of the population act device.
No significant changes in the statutes were made in 1970, but the home
rule thrust was continued in 1971 with the passage of a broad county home
rule bill. 62 The new law replaced the vague 1969 law with a code of county
powers and the repeal of numerous limiting provisions relating to narrow,
specific county powers. The intent was to clarify and expand the home rule
powers of counties and to encourage counties to exercise them.
The recodification of county powers, which occupies about one full page
in the statute books, in several instances replaced whole chapters of restric-

158.
159.
Annual
160.
161.
162.

Ciocca v. Summerlin, No. 70-297 (19th Cir. Ct. Fla., Oct. 1, 1970).
Address by Mr. Charles R. P. Brown, City Attorney, Ft. Pierce, Fla., Tenth
Conference for City Attorneys, Feb. 15, 1971.
Vanlandingham, supra note 98, at 308.
FLA. STAT. §145.16 (1971).
Ch. 71-14 [1971] Fla. Laws 76.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1973

27

Florida
Review,
Vol. REVIEW
25, Iss. 2 [1973], Art. [Vol.
3
LAW
OFLaw
FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY

xxv

tive detail with as little as a phrase. For example, an entire chapter 163 on
free public libraries was repealed and replaced by a single word in the general
powers section.164 Many matters, which were formerly included within the
statutes because of the restrictive attitude towards local government powers,
but which became unnecessary under the home rule concept, were eliminated
entirely. Sections authorizing the purchase of bloodhounds and directing the
sheriff to feed, train, and exercise them daily are illustrative.'6 5 Thus, chapter
71-14 is significant as the first act of home rule implementing legislation to
address itself to the elimination of preexisting detailed authorizing legislation, passed under earlier philosophies, that could be restrictive under the
constitutional limitations on home rule. In addition, as in other home rule
legislation, there is a specific direction that the act is to be liberally construed to secure the broad exercise of home rule powers.' 66
Another significant point about the act is that it draws no distinction
between charter and non-charter counties, evidencing a legislative intent to
provide the fullest possible extent of home rule powers for all counties.
The range and scope of the powers enumerated by the new law are so
broad and comprehensive as to encompass all readily imaginable local
government concerns. The role of chapter 71-14 in the home rule scheme is
such that it has been described as "in fact and intent, a legislative charter
for a non-charter county. "167
Related Legislation- The Population Act Repealer
Another act of similar importance and effect was passed during the 1971
session, this one relating to the population act problem and its detrimental
effect on the scope of home rule powers. This measure provided perhaps
the most dramatic evidence of the radical change in philosophies since the
adoption of the revised constitution. With reference to the specific problem
of population acts, in 1971 the certification of the 1970 federal census had
added a note of urgent necessity to that same need for encouragement of
expanded exercise of home rule powers that also spawned the county home
rule bill in the same session. Under the new census figures, population
brackets in the many population acts already on the books would no longer
necessarily have their originally intended effect. Legislators and local officials
had to be aware of what formerly applicable acts would no longer apply to
their locales under existing brackets, what formerly inapplicable acts would
become applicable, and of the alternative courses of action open to them

163. Fla. Laws ch. 71-14, §3 (1971), repealing Law of June 15, 1931, ch. 14, 756 [1931]
Fla. Laws 465.
164. FI.A. STAr. §125.01 (1) (f) (1971).
165. Fla. Laws ch. 71-14, §3 (1971), repealing Law of May 15, 1905, ch. 5415 [1905]
Fla. Laws 94.
166. Ch. 71-14, §6 [1971] Fla. Laws 77.
167. Memorandum by Mr. Robert L. Nabors, Attorney for the Brevard County, Fla.
County Commission, on file at the Committee on Community Affairs, Fla. House of

Representatives, Tallahassee, Fla. (undated).
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to either retain desired laws or remain free from those not desired. In short,
the recurring, decennial problem of population act update faced the state.
Certification of the 1970 census, however, created a situation unlike any
other. The effects of constitutional revision introduced new complexities,
demanding something more than the usual routine updating of population
brackets. In 1970 a real opportunity to eliminate the bulk of the population
act existed. In a memorandum to all members of the Florida House of
Representatives, Representative Paul W. Danahy, Chairman of the House
Committee on Community Affairs, outlined several factors providing impetus for an entirely new approach:16
2. Two aspects of the constitutional prohibitions contained in
Article III must be considered. First, the prohibited list of subjects
for special acts now applies also to "general laws of local application,"
a term commonly understood to include population acts. Secondly,
the categories of prohibited special laws are different from those in
the old Constitution. Thus, exery existing population act should be
tested against the new categories. Attention should also be given to
subsection (b) of Article III, Section 11, which is largely declaratory
of existing case law but is so clearly stated as to make its avoidance
difficult, viz: a classification of governmental entities must be reasonably related to the subject of the law.
3. The home rule powers granted under the new Constitution
should be considered as a possible substitution for the population act
method of handling local legislation. Even non-charter counties have
qualified authority to adopt ordinances- State Constitution, Article
VIII, Section 1 (f). Also, there are now a number of acts for cities
within counties of a specified population, but there is little if any
necessity under the new municipal home rule powers for such acts to
be continued.
4. In earlier years the State Auditor was an executive official and
as such was bound by the court ruling that an executive officer cannot
question the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature until it is
held invalid by a judicial proceeding. The Auditor General is now a
legislative officer and may not be bound by the same restraint.
Another unique aspect of the situation confronting the legislature in
1971 was the enormity of the task of dealing with existing population acts
on an individual, or even county-by-county basis. Well over half of the
acts ultimately repealed by chapter 71-29 (1,320 out of 2,139) were originally
enacted after the 1960 census.
In view of these figures, as well as the other factors pointed out above,
the decision was made to attempt a fresh start with a single repealer bill
that would eliminate existing population acts. Such an approach afforded a
means of calling attention dramatically to the problems inherent in this
type of legislation and to the new alternatives available through exercise of
home rule powers. The intent to discourage future population acts and expand home rule powers by elimination of existing population acts was made

168. Memorandum from Representative Paul W. Danahy to members of the Fla.
House of Representatives, Dec. 9, 1970.
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very apparent. It was set forth explicitly, both in the bill itself,6 9 and in
the report accompanying its submission as a committee bill by the House
Committee on Community Affairs. The report was entered in the house
journal upon final passage of the bill (which was without a single "nay"
vote) to provide additional evidence of the legislative intent. That report
concluded:170
In considering the alternative recommendations which could be
made to the House of Representatives, the Committee recognizes an
obligation to avoid the constitutional problems hereinbefore described.
The Committee concludes that the only responsible alternative is to
discontinue the use of general laws of local application. Accordingly,
such legislation now in effect should be repealed prior to the effectiveness of the 1970 census and any future attempts to utilize this form of
legislation should receive unfavorable consideration by the Legislature. Thereafter, the legitimate interests of local governments not resolved under general law can be served by the passage of duly enacted
local laws, if necessary, or, preferably, by the exercise of home rule
powers which now or may hereafter exist.
In order to implement the recommended policy, the Committee
proposes [House Bill 932], which provides for repeal of population acts
as previously described. This bill also provides for the continuation of all
courts. And, in order not to disrupt the orderly, ongoing processes of
government, it provides for the substance of population acts to have
the effect of ordinances until changed locally, which would continue
the provisions of such acts, but on the condition subsequent of repeal
or modification by the affected local government.
It is the view of the Committee that this bill meets the single
subject requirement of Section 6 of Article III of the State Constitution because the thrust of the bill is to implement a policy regarding
a particular type or form of legislation rather than to consider the
individual merits of previous enactments.
As pointed out by the committee report, House Bill 932, which became
chapter 71-29, Laws of Florida, repealed almost all existing population acts.
Unaffected were those population acts, deemed based on valid classifications
by editorial judgement, which appeared in the Florida Statutes. The repealer
is found in section 2 of the act, which lists the chapter numbers of the
2,139 acts affected. Section 3, however, continues the substance of these repealed acts in various forms. Repealed chapters relating to courts were made
general laws of the state. 71 Those that related to counties and municipalities
were made ordinances of the affected entities subject to modification or
repeal as any such ordinance would be.172 Similarly, those repealed acts
applicable to school districts were made district regulations, subject to modification or repeal by the district. 173 Finally, a provision was added allowing

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Ch. 71-29, §1 [1971]
FLA. H.R. JouR., 1st
Ch. 71-29, §3 [1971]
Id. §§3(2), 3(3), at
Id. §3(4), at 116.

Fla. Laws 97.
Reg. Sess. 1971, at 151.
Fla. Laws 116.
116.
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the "new" ordinances, et cetera, to continue in conflict with general state
1 74
law to the extent previously permitted, pending subsequent repeals.
Other sections of 71-29 provide for: the continuation of contracts, licenses,
franchises, privileges, or trust agreements in effect that relied upon any of
the repealed chapters for their authority;:" 5 a standard severability clause to
preserve the remainder of the act should any part be held invalid; 76 and for
the act to take effect twenty-nine days after final adjournment of the 1971
regular session, which was one day before the effective date of the 1970 census
figures for purposes of population classifications' 77
Several possible constitutional problems were raised during the formulation and consideration of chapter 71-29. The first potential question raised
was that of the single subject and title limitations of the constitution. Other
questions arose from section 3 of the act and the manner in which court
related population acts became "general law" and other repealed acts became
local ordinances and regulations. To date, no court has passed directly on
the validity of chapter 71-29. It was, however, relied on by the Florida
supreme court to render moot a controversy as to the validity of a population act, which it had repealed. 78
The single subject and title requirements of the 1968 constitution read:
"Every law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected
therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title."'79 Obviously
the many population acts repealed by chapter 71-29 did not 'all embrace
the same subject matter, and this has caused concern as to whether their
repeal in a single act could meet the constitutional standards. Florida Jurisprudence provides some illumination of the constitutional language: 8 0
Every statute must embrace but one subject and matter properly
connected therewith. In this regard, the "object" of a law is not the
same as the subject of a law. The "object" is the aim or purpose of the
enactment. The "subject" is the chief thing or matter to which the law
relates and with which it deals. Ordinarily, the statute may include
every matter germane, incidental, or subsidiary to, and not inconsistent with or foreign to, the general subject of the act as expressed
in the title. The test of duplicity of subject is whether or not the provisions of the bill are designed to accomplish separated and disassociated objects of legislative effort.
The title of chapter 71-29 reads:
An act relating to legislation; repealing specified general laws of
local application; providing legislative intent; preserving matters relating to judiciary; providing for exercise of powers by local govern-

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. §3 (5), at 116.
Id. §4, at 117.
Id. §5, at 117.
Id. §6, at 117.
Board Pub. Instruction v. Budget Comm., 249 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1971).
FLA. CONST. art. III, §6.
30 FLA. JUL Statutes §62 (1960).
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ments; providing for exercise of powers by local governments; providing for non-impairment of obligations; providing severability; providing effective date.
With the title so framed, it appears obvious that the question of the
subject matter of the various population acts is irrelevant to the subject of
the repealer act. The single broad subject, "legislation," appears to encompass adequately all of the provisions of the act. Similarly, it appears that
the act may be said to be designed to accomplish a single object, "to restore the regulation of local government to the constitutionally recognized
modes of enactment."18s In fact, the approach taken by chapter 71-29 appears
to be the only practical method of achieving this objective.
The purpose of the single subject and title requirements is to prevent
surprise and "log-rolling" (inclusion of unrelated matters in a single bill)
in legislation. Since the single legislative object of the repealer act is to
return substantive decisions to local governments or other proper legislative
forms in place of the much abused population act, neither of these purposes
would be served by its invalidation. Also worth noting is a recent decision,
18 2
reflecting a long line of cases, which stated:
While it is the duty of the courts to strike down an act which clearly
offends the above cited constitutional requirement, it is a well settled
principle that courts should refuse to declare an act void as violative
of this section except in clear cases free from every reasonable doubt.
In view of the constitutional provisions, their purposes, the posture of the
law relating to them, and the manner in which the act in question was
framed, it was the opinion of the legislature that the constitutional requirements were satisfied.
Another line of reasoning, which was advanced during the drafting stage,
rejected the idea that the repealer act could embrace only a single subject
but sought to uphold it as a reviser's bill, the recognized exception to the
single subject requirement. There is some merit in analogizing the nature
and breadth of chapter 71-29 to the act adopting by reference the common
and statutory law of England, which was upheld in Mathis v. State.8 3 In
fact, as introduced, House Bill 932 was captioned as a reviser's bill. How1
ever, upon close examination of the statute authorizing reviser's bills, 84
especially subsection (6) (j), which was much relied upon in advancing the
theory, it appears that the device is intended to be used for changes in the
Florida Statutes. Population acts of the nature repealed by chapter 71-29
never appear in the statutes by direction of the same section'8 5 Another
point against the reviser's bill argument is that this is not an act to revise at
all; the population acts are not altered, but are repealed as such.

181. Ch. 71-29, §1 [1971] Fla. Laws 97.
182. State v. Reedy Creek Improvement Dist., 216 So. 2d 202, 206 (Fla. 1968).
183. 31 Fla. 291, 12 So. 681 (1893).
184.
185.

FLA.
FLA.

STAT.
STAT.

§11.242 (Supp. 1972).
§11.242 (5) () (Supp. 1972).
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Other problems arise in consideration of section 3 of chapter 71-29. These
do not go to the validity of the entire act, however, and do not pose any
threat of invalidating the repealer provision of section 2.
The first problem to be considered here is actually not one of validity
at all, but is one of interpretation and effect. Subsection 1 was intended to
preserve population acts relating to courts only as and where they were
applicable under the 1960 census. 8" The language of the law says only that
such chapters "shall become general laws of the state on the effective date
of this act. .... 18'7 This language apparently preserves the population
bracket language of those chapters and its progressive application to each
successive census, which was not intended. It also raises the possibility of a
revival of acts that were earlier superseded by general law.
Another problem relative to subsection 1 was that of the directive to
the legislative service bureau to include the court related chapters in the
Florida Statutes. This presented a potential conflict with section 11.242, of
the Florida Statutes but was deleted by an amendment adopted during a
special session in December 1971.181 It should be noted that any problems
relative to court related population acts may be rendered moot by the revision
of article V of the constitution, approved by the voters in March 1972.
The final problem remaining to be discussed deals with the authority
of the legislature to enact local ordinances or regulations, as ig done in a
sense in subsections 2, 3,and 4 of section 3 (the language is "shall become").
Though no express authority or precise precedent appears, the legislature
is recognized as supreme in the legislative field, 8 9 and all the constitutional
grants of home rule power remain subject to the power of the legislature. 90
In line with this, "a valid ordinance may be impliedly repealed by an enactment of a statute on the same subject, utterly repugnant to it";' ' the
power to repeal providing an analogy to the power to enact. On the other
hand, it may be argued that enactment of an ordinance by the legislature
is invalid as an attempt to pass a local or special law without meeting the
notice referendum requirements of the constitution. In answer, points that
may be advanced include: (1) acts being transferred into ordinances have
already been presumably constitutionally enacted and they are in effect just
being retained in a different state; (2) the ordinances are permissive, rather
than compulsory, and by the terms of the act, may be retained or eliminated
at the option of the local governments; (3) these are not special acts inasmuch as they are being carried over by means of a general statute having
statewide application and dealing with the question of population acts
T

186. Interview with Mr. John Wesley White, Staff Director, Committee on Community
Affairs, Fla. House of Representatives, in Tallahassee, Fla., Dec. 17, 1971.
187. Ch. 71-29, §3(1) [1971] Fla. Laws 116.
188. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-978.
189. State ex rel. Davis v. Clearwater, 106 Fla. 761, 139 So. 377 (1931), af'd on rehearing,
108 Fla. 635, 146 So. 836 (1933); State ex rel. Davis v. Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335, 64

A.L.R. 1307 (1929).
190. See text accompanying notes 134-135 supra.
191. 62 C.JS. Municipal Corporations §437 (1949).
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throughout the state; and (4) the state will be expanding, rather than
abridging, the power of the people acting through their local governments.
Even if these subsections should be held invalid, the repeal of the old
population acts in section 2 of the act would be unaffected. In most instances, those provisions that were desirable could be reenacted under the
new home rule powers of the local governments. Those matters contrary
to general law could be reenacted in the form of special laws if outside the
subject matter prohibitions of the constitution. All that would be lost would
be those old population acts that were "grandfathered" into ordinances and
would not fall under either home rule powers or the legislature's special
act powers. The reenactment of repealed population acts as ordinances left
the option open to the local governments to retain the substance of such
ordinances if they so desired, and no doubt made the repealer act politically
more saleable. The invalidation of the reenactment provisions could actually
strengthen the act, since those provisions preserved that which could not
be reenacted by other constitutionally acceptable methods. Such laws represent the type of abuses that the discouragement of invalid population acts
is designed to prevent.
While significant strides were achieved by home rule proponents during
the 1971 session with the enactment of chapters 71-14 and 71-29, not all
home rule proposals were as well received. House Joint Resolution 694, a
proposal to amend the constitutional provisions relative to municipalities
was defeated in the house of representatives. 192 It would have changed the
exception to the general powers clause to read: "except as specifically prohibited by general law."
A different approach was taken to the municipal home rule area in the
1972 session. A bill, House Bill 3900, was introduced by the House Committee
on Community Affairs that would have repealed all but three of the chapters
in the existing title 12 of the statutes on cities and towns. The idea was
basically the same as that behind chapters 71-14 and 71-29, the removal of
outdated enabling legislation, which under the new philosophies served only
to hobble home rule powers. The bill was different, however, in that no
necessity existed for an enumeration of general powers to be granted because
of the constitution's differences in regard to municipalities and non-charter
counties. While repealing sixteen chapters of statutes, the bill would have
enacted only three new ones. These three chapters dealt with areas of state
concern. The first new chapter, 164, included: minimum criteria for incorporation, which was to be accomplished only by special act; procedures
for charter amendment; qualifications of electors; and procedures for changes
of municipal boundaries. Chapter 179, designed to replace part or all of
six different chapters, provided a general authority for municipal borrowing
and issuance of all types of municipal bonds for any municipal project. The
new chapter 182 covered the field of municipal taxation, consolidating and
simplifying existing law where possible. The bill was a victim of the legislative time-crunch and died in the House Committee on Finance and Taxation.

192.

FLA. H.R. Joup., Ist Reg. Sess. 1971, at 152.
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Despite these two instances in the area of municipal home rule, the legislature has established a very strong, positive record on home rule in general
since the adoption of the 1968 Revised Constitution. In addition to implementing legislation, which has not always been as effective as might be hoped
but at least has not been drawn consciously to limit home rule powers, there
is evidence of a real effort to minimize legislative interference through special
laws and population acts, particularly in 1972. The 1969 regular session saw
the passage of 1,211 acts in these categories, down from totals of 1,473, 1,832,
and 1,584 in 1963, 1965, and 1967 respectively1 93 With the advent of annual
sessions, the totals for 1970 and 1971 fell to 534 and 592, which give a
combined two-year figure roughly comparable to that of 1969.194 In 1972,
however, following passage of chapters 71-14 and 71-29, the combined total of
population and special acts plummeted to 292.195 This reduction can also
be attributed to a new policy in the house of representatives referring all
local bills to the committee of substance for the same type of scrutiny given
general bills.
Unfortunately, however, the strong positive attitude of the legislative
branch toward expansion of home rule has not been mirrored in the executive
and judicial branches of Florida government. For example on March 12,
1972, the attorney general's office issued an opinion that a city commission
could not fix the compensation of future city commissioners by ordinance
"[u]nless explicitly authorized to do so by general or special law or Charter
,"96 The opinion paid lip service to the home rule provisions
Act . .
of the 1968 Revised Constitution before proceeding to find, under expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, a rule of statutory construction, that there was
an implied prohibition of compensation for commissioners in the fact that
the city charter was silent on the matter. The implementing home rule legislation, Florida Statutes, section 167.005, was mentioned only parenthetically
in reference to an earlier attorney general's opinion, which was cited as
authority for the position that home rule powers are limited by implied prohibitions in general or special law. To ignore the legislature's consistently
repeated and clear mandate for a broad construction of home rule powers
and rely on a rule of construction to raise an implied prohibition from the
mere absence of any legislative provision on the particular subject is clearly
antithetical to the philosophy of the new constitution.
Exactly one month later, on April 12, 1972, the home rule philosophy
was thrust aside again in the Florida supreme court's ruling in the case of
City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc.19 7 The majority opinion,
written by Chief Justice Roberts and concurred in by Justices Carlton, Adins,
and Boyd, first notes the new constitutional language in comparison with
the old, then restates and follows the old Dillon's Rule approach of requiring
specific delegation of powers and resolving doubts against the city. In the
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Data on file, Office of Secretary of State, Laws Div., Tallahassee, Fla.
Id.
FLORIDA JoINT LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT COMM., supra note 109, Supp. 1.
Op. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 072-118, March 12, 1972.
261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
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next sentence after setting forth the provisions of article VIII, section 2 (b)
(providing powers "to conduct municipal government, perform municipal
functions and render municipal services and
. .
powers for municipal
purposes"), the court states that municipal powers are still limited "to the performance of municipal functions."' 19s The remainder of the opinion on the
first issue, which is the question of whether the city had the power to enact
the ordinance in question, is slightly more encouraging. There are indications
that the subject matter of the ordinance, rent control, is the crucial factor
and not the absence of a specific delegation of the power in question. However,
even if the holding is limited to a finding that rent control is not a municipal
function and is therefore not within the city's power, it would appear to
conflict with the constitutional grant of "any power for municipal purposes
except as otherwise provided by law. ' 199
In addition to ruling that the city did not have power to enact the
ordinance in question, the majority also found it invalid on two other
grounds: that is was an unlawful delegation of legislative authority by the
city council, and that the ordinance conflicted with sections 83.04, 83.06, and
83.20 of the state statutes concerning landlord-tenant relationships and eviction of tenants at will or sufferance. This was found to conflict with the
ordinance's prohibition of removal of a housing unit from the market where
0

eviction would result.2 0

Justice Dekle dissented from the majority's view on the construction of
municipal powers under the 1968 Revised Constitution, but concurred in
the result. He agreed that the ordinance did not contain sufficient guidelines
and standards and therefore was an unlawful delegation of legislative authority
20 1
by the city council to the city rent agency.

Justice Ervin, in a strong dissent, differed with the majority on all three
202
points. On the first point, with Justice Dekle concurring, he stated:
The majority has totally ignored the intent and plain meaning of
these new sections. Its holding on this point will return to this state
the plethora of local bills, which evil was supposedly obviated by
Article VIII, Section 2 (b).
Under the pertinent section of Florida's Constitution . . . a
municipality may enact a rent control ordinance without receiving
specific authorization from the State Legislature if (1) rent control
is a municipal function and (2) there is no contrary or superseding
legislation. Article VIII, Section 2 (b) places no other limitations on a
municipality's power to enact ordinances.
Justice McCain also dissented from the majority opinion, but without
opinion of his own. On the question of home rule powers, therefore, the
majority carried the case by a bare 4-3 split. This, along with the hint that

198. Id. at 803.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §2 (b) (emphasis added).
200. 261 So. 2d 801, 806 (Fla. 1972).
201. Id. at 807.
202. Id. at 806-08.
199.
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the decision may in the future be limited to its narrow subject matter, is
about all the comfort home rule proponents can draw from this potentially
very damaging ruling. In any event, problems are likely to result from its
outcome, as it will tend to reinforce the already evident conservatism and
reluctance on the part of many city and county officials in asserting and
exercising home rule powers.
Conclusion
It appears from such continuing resistance to home rule as now provided
by the constitution and statutes that the attempt at a legal reordering of
legislative power relationships has not fully succeeded in the face of the
lingering influence of old philosophies. Perhaps this concept of home rule
cannot successfully be superimposed over existing entities and structures.
Perhaps it can be made truly effective only when its adoption is accompanied
by the kind of thorough rethinking of structures, functions, and responsibilities contemplated in the creation of the commission on local government
in the 1972 session. 20 3 The next few years are sure to provide at least a
part of the answer and promise to be perhaps the most significant yet in
the history of local government in Florida.

203. Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-44.
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